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In the first week of April 2014 we were at “The Symposium on Security for Asia Network" (SyScan), a “geeky” single-track conference located in Singapore.



I liked the friendly atmosphere from the very first slides of the event (as is seen above).

The program covered hardware and software attacks like “Car Hacking”, “Defeating SecureBoot”, “Point-of-Sale”-hacks (“Flappy Bird” injected on a mobile POS device was my favorite), “RFID”-hacks, “Anti-Virus Software” flaws, “Phone hacks”, “OS-Hacks” and a “Linux Memory Forensic” case study amongst others.

All of the presentations were of quite high quality in content and most of the speakers did a nice job presenting their content.

Much beer did flow at the “BarCon” at the end of day one ...

Virus Watch|Agent.btz: a source of inspiration?

Aleks
Kaspersky Lab Expert
Posted March 12, 15:01  GMT
Tags: Botnets, Targeted Attacks, Cyber espionage
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The past few days has seen an extensive discussion within the IT security industry about a cyberespionage campaign called Turla, aka Snake and Uroburos, which, according to G-DATA experts, may have been created by Russian special services.

One of the main conclusions also pointed out by research from BAE SYSTEMS, is a connection between the authors of Turla and those of another malicious program, known as Agent.BTZ, which infected the local networks of US military operations in the Middle East in 2008.

We first became aware of this targeted campaign in March 2013. This became apparent when we investigated an incident which involved a highly sophisticated rootkit. We called it the ‘Sun rootkit’, based on a filename used as a virtual file system: sunstore.dmp, also accessible as \\.\Sundrive1 and \\.\Sundrive2. The ‘Sun rootkit’ and Uroburos are the same.

We are still actively investigating Turla, and we believe it is far more complex and versatile than the already published materials suggest.

At this point, I would like to discuss the connection between Turla and Agent.btz in a little more detail.

Agent.btz: a global epidemic or a targeted attack?

The story of Agent.btz began back in 2007 and was extensively covered by the mass media in late 2008 when it was used to infect US military networks.

Here is what Wikipedia has to say about it: “The 2008 cyberattack on the United States was the ‘worst breach of U.S. military computers in history’. The defense against the attack was named ‘Operation Buckshot Yankee’. It led to the creation of the United States Cyber Command.

It started when a USB flash drive infected by a foreign intelligence agency was left in the parking lot of a Department of Defense facility at a base in the Middle East. It contained malicious code and was put into a USB port from a laptop computer that was attached to United States Central Command.

The Pentagon spent nearly 14 months cleaning the worm, named Agent.btz, from military networks. Agent.btz, a variant of the SillyFDC worm, has the ability ‘to scan computers for data, open backdoors, and send through those backdoors to a remote command and control server’.”

We do not know how accurate is the story with the USB flash drive left in the parking lot. We have also heard a number of other versions of this story, which may, or may not be right. However, the important fact here is that Agent.btz was a self replicating computer worm, not just a Trojan. Another important fact is that the malware has dozens of different variants.

We believe that the initial variants of the worm were created back in 2007. By 2011 a large number of its modifications had been detected. Today, most variants are detected by Kaspersky products as Worm.Win32.Orbina.

Curiously, in accordance with the naming convention used by PC Tools, the worm is also named Voronezh.1600 – possibly a reference to the mythical Voronezh school of hackers, in Russia.

In any event, it is quite obvious that the US military were not the only victims of the worm. Copying itself from one USB flash drive to another, it rapidly spread globally. Although no new variants of the malware have been created for several years and the vulnerability enabling the worm to launch from USB flash drives using “autorun.inf” have long since been closed in newer versions of Windows, according to our data Agent.btz was detected 13,832 times in 107 countries across the globe in 2013 alone!

The dynamics of the worm’s epidemic are also worth noting. Over three years – from 2011 to 2013 – the number of infections caused by Agent.btz steadily declined; however, the top 10 affected countries changed very little.

Agent.BTZ detections (unique users) 2011
1 Russian Federation 24111
2 Spain 9423
3 Italy 5560
4 Kazakhstan 4412
5 Germany 3186
6 Poland 3068
7 Latvia 2805
8 Lithuania 2016
9 United Kingdom 761
10 Ukraine 629
  Total countries 147
  Total users 63021


Agent.BTZ detections (unique users) 2012
1 Russian Federation 11211
2 Spain 5195
3 Italy 3052
4 Germany 2185
5 Kazakhstan 1929
6 Poland 1664
7 Latvia 1282
8 Lithuania 861
9 United Kingdom 335
10 Ukraine 263
  Total countries 130
  Total users 30923


Agent.BTZ detections (unique users) 2013
1 Russian Federation 4566
2 Spain 2687
3 Germany 1261
4 Italy 1067
5 Kazakhstan 868
6 Poland 752
7 Latvia 562
8 Lithuania 458
9 Portugal 157
10 United Kingdom 123
  Total countries 107
  Total users 13832


The statistics presented above are based on the following Kaspersky Anti-Virus verdicts: Worm.Win32.Autorun.j, Worm.Win32.Autorun.bsu, Worm.Win32.Autorun.bve, Trojan-Downloader.Win32.Agent.sxi, Worm.Win32.AutoRun.lqb, Trojan.Win32.Agent.bve, Worm.Win32.Orbina

To summarize the above, the Agent.btz worm has clearly spread all over the world, with Russia leading in terms of the number of infections for several years.



Map of infections caused by different modifications of “Agent.btz” in 2011-2013

For detailed information on the modus operandi of Agent.btz, I recommend reading an excellent report prepared by Sergey Shevchenko from ThreatExpert, back in November 2008.

On infected systems, the worm creates a file named ‘thumb.dd’ on all USB flash drives connected to the computer, using it to store a CAB file containing the following files: “winview.ocx”, “wmcache.nld” and “mswmpdat.tlb”. These files contain information about the infected system and the worm’s activity logs for that system. Essentially, “thumb.dd” is a container for data which is saved on the flash drive, unless it can be sent directly over the Internet to the C&C server.

If such a flash drive is inserted into another computer infected with Orbina, the file “thumb.dd” will be copied to the computer under the name “mssysmgr.ocx”.

Given this functionality and the global scale of the epidemic caused by the worm, we believe that there are tens of thousands of USB flash drives in the world containing files named “thumb.dd” created by Agent.btz at some point in time and containing information about systems infected by the worm.

Red October: a data collector?

Over one year ago, we analyzed dozens of modules used by Red October, an extremely sophisticated cyber espionage operation. While performing the analysis, we noticed that the list of files that a module named “USB Stealer” searches for on USB flash drives connected to infected computers included the names of files created by Agent.btz “mssysmgr.ocx” and “thumb.dd”.

This means that Red October developers were actively looking for data collected several years previously by Agent.btz. All the USB Stealer modules known to us were created in 2010-2011.

Both Red October and Agent.btz were, in all probability, created by Russian-speaking malware writers. One program “knew” about the files created by the other and tried to make use of them. Are these facts sufficient to conclude that there was a direct connection between the developers of the two malicious programs?

I believe they are not.

First and foremost, it should be noted that the fact that the file “thumb.dd” contains data from Agent.btz-infected systems was publicly known. It is not impossible that the developers of Red October, who must have been aware of the large number of infections caused by Agent.btz and of the fact that the worm had infected US military networks, simply tried to take advantage of other people’s work to collect additional data. It should also be remembered that Red October was a tool for highly targeted pinpoint attacks, whereas Agent.btz was a worm, by definition designed to spread uncontrollably and “collect” any data it could access.

Basically, any malware writer could add scanning of USB flash drives for “thumb.dd” files and the theft of those files to their Trojan functionality. Why not steal additional data without too much additional effort? However, decrypting the data stolen requires one other thing – the encryption key.

Agent.btz and Turla/Uroburos

The connection between Turla and Agent.btz is more direct, although not sufficiently so to conclude that the two programs have the same origin.

Turla uses the same file names as Agent.btz – “mswmpdat.tlb”, “winview.ocx” and “wmcache.nld” for its log files stored on infected systems.

All the overlapping file names are presented in the table below:

Agent.btz Red October Turla
Log files thumb.dd thumb.dd  
  winview.ocx   winview.ocx
  mssysmgr.ocx mssysmgr.ocx  
  wmcache.nld   wmcache.nld
  mswmpdat.tlb   mswmpdat.tlb
  fa.tmp   fa.tmp


In addition, Agent.btz and Turla use the same XOR key to encrypt their log files:

1dM3uu4j7Fw4sjnbcwlDqet4F7JyuUi4m5Imnxl1pzxI6
as80cbLnmz54cs5Ldn4ri3do5L6gs923HL34x2f5cvd0fk6c1a0s

The key is not a secret, either: it was discovered and published back in 2008 and anybody who had an interest in the Agent.btz story knew about the key. Is it possible that the developers of Turla decided to use somebody else’s key to encrypt their logs? We are as yet unable to determine at what point in time this particular key was adopted for Turla. It is present in the latest samples (dated 2013-2014), but according to some data the development of Turla began back in 2006 – before the earliest known variant of Agent.btz was created.

Red October and Turla

Now we have determined that Red October “knew” about the file names used by Agent.btz and searched for them. We have also determined that Turla used the same file names and encryption key as Agent.btz.

So what about a possible connection between Red October and Turla? Is there one? Having analyzed all the data at our disposal, we do not see any overlapping between the two projects. They do not “know” about each other, they do not communicate between themselves in any way, they are different in terms of their architecture and the technologies used.

The only thing they really have in common is that the developers of both Rocra and Turla appear to have Russian as their native language.

What about Flame?

Back in 2012, while analyzing Flame and its cousins Gauss and MiniFlame, we noticed some similarities between them and Agent.btz (Orbina). The first thing we noticed was the analogous naming convention applied, with a predominance of use of files with the .ocx extension. Let’s take as an example the name of the main module of Flame – “mssecmgr.ocx”. In Agent.btz a very similar name was used for the log-file container on the infected system – “mssysmgr.ocx”. And in Gauss all modules were in the form of files with names *.ocx.

Feature Flame Gauss
Encryption methods XOR XOR
Using USB as storage Yes (hub001.dat) Yes (.thumbs.db)


The Kurt/Godel module in Gauss contains the following functionality: when a drive contains a '.thumbs.db' file, its contents are read and checked for the magic number 0xEB397F2B. If found, the module creates %commonprogramfiles%\system\wabdat.dat and writes the data to this file, and then deletes the '.thumbs.db' file.

This is a container for data stolen by the 'dskapi' payload.

Besides, MiniFlame (module icsvnt32) also ‘knew’ about the ‘.thumbs.db’ file, and conducted a search for it on USB sticks.

If we recall how our data indicate that the development of both Flame and Gauss started back in 2008, it can’t be ruled out that the developers of these programs were well acquainted with the analysis of Agent.btz and possibly used some ideas taken from it in their development activities.

All together now

The data can be presented in the form of a diagram showing the interrelations among all the analyzed malicious programs:

As can be seen in the diagram, the developers of all three (even four, if we include Gauss) spy programs knew about Agent.btz, i.e., about how it works and what filenames it uses, and used that information either to directly adopt the functionality, ideas and even filename, or attempted to use the results of the work of Agent.btz.

Summarizing all the above, it is possible to regard Agent.btz as a certain starting point in the chain of creation of several different cyber-espionage projects. The well-publicized story of how US military networks were infected could have served as the model for new espionage programs having similar objectives, while its technologies were clearly studied in great detail by all interested parties. Were the people behind all these programs all the same? It’s possible, but the facts can’t prove it.

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What exactly is Careto / "The Mask"?

The Mask is an advanced threat actor that has been involved in cyber-espionage operations since at least 2007.

What makes The Mask special is the complexity of the toolset used by the attackers. This includes an extremely sophisticated piece of malware, a rootkit, a bootkit, Mac OS X and Linux versions and possibly versions for Android and iPad/iPhone (iOS).

The Mask also uses a customized attack against older Kaspersky Lab products in order to hide in the system. This puts it above Duqu in terms of sophistication, making The Mask one of the most advanced threats at the current time. This and several other factors make us believe this could be a state-sponsored operation.

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The world of APTs is a colorful place. In 2012, we uncovered Flame, a massive cyberespionage operation infiltrating computers in the Middle East. Our research indicated a connection with the wellknown Stuxnet cyberweapon, designed to sabotage the Iranian nuclear program.

In early 2013, we announced our research on RedOctober, a cyberespionage operation focusing on diplomatic institutions. In June 2013, we published our research on NetTraveler, and in September, our research on the Kimsuky attacks.

Our analysis of all these different APT operations indicated an unique use of languages, that offer clues regarding some of the people behind these operations. If the comments in the Flame C&C were written in English, artifacts in RedOctober indicated Russian speakers, NetTraveler indicated Chinese natives. Finally, Kimsuky indicated Korean speaking authors, which we linked to North Korea.

During the past months we have been busy analysing yet another sophisticated cyberespionage operation which has been going on at least since 2007, infecting victims in 27 countries. We deemed this operation "The Mask" for reasons to be explained later.

Incidents|The Icefog APT Hits US Targets With Java Backdoor

Costin Raiu
Kaspersky Lab Expert
Posted January 14, 09:30  GMT
Tags: JavaScript, Targeted Attacks
VitalyK
Kaspersky Lab Expert
Posted January 14, 09:30  GMT
Tags: JavaScript, Targeted Attacks
Igor Soumenkov
Kaspersky Lab Expert
Posted January 14, 09:30  GMT
Tags: JavaScript, Targeted Attacks
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In September 2013, we published our extensive analysis of Icefog, an APT campaign that focused on the supply chain – targeting government institutions, military contractors, maritime and ship-building groups.

Icefog, also known as the "Dagger Panda" by Crowdstrike's naming convention, infected targets mainly in South Korea and Japan. You can find our Icefog APT analysis and detailed report here.

Since the publication of our report, the Icefog attackers went completely dark, shutting down all known command-and-control servers. Nevertheless, we continued to monitor the operation by sinkholing domains and analysing victim connections. During this monitoring, we observed an interesting type of connection which seemed to indicate a Java version of Icefog, further to be referenced as "Javafog".


Meet "Lingdona"

The Icefog operation has been operational since at least 2011, with many different variants released during this time. For Microsoft Windows PCs, we identified at least 6 different generations:

  • The "old" 2011 Icefog – sends stolen data by e-mail; this version was used against the Japanese House of Representatives and the House of Councillors in 2011.
  • Type "1" "normal" Icefog – interacts with command-and-control servers via a set of ".aspx" scripts.
  • Type "2" Icefog – interacts with a script-based proxy server that redirects commands from the attackers to another machine.
  • Type "3" Icefog – a variant that uses a certain type of C&C server with scripts named "view.asp" and "update.asp"
  • Type "4" Icefog – a variant that uses a certain type of C&C server with scripts named "upfile.asp"
  • Icefog-NG – communicates by direct TCP connection to port 5600

In addition to these, we also identified "Macfog", a native Mac OS X implementation of Icefog that infected several hundred victims worldwide.

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Every single day, Kaspersky Lab processes more than 300,000 new malware samples. The vast majority of these malicious files is what we call crimeware -- computer programs designed for financial profit and used by cyber-criminals to make money. From the remaining percentage, a small amount are designed exclusively for cyber-espionage and used by a variety of advanced threat actors.

What is left is an even smaller percentage of the total and includes rare, unusual things. Wipers, which are highly destructive programs, are some of the rarest kinds of malware, however, their usage has spiked over the last few years.

Back in the old days, most of the malware was written by computer enthusiasts,  cyber-hooligans and pranksters. Hence, destructive viruses, or Trojans, were much more common. Some examples include BadSectors, a computer virus that would mark disk sectors as bad, even if they weren’t, resulting in subtle corruption of data.  Another example was OneHalf, a computer virus that would encrypt the hard drive cylinder-by-cylinder, transparently decrypting it on the fly while active. If one were to remove the virus,that would leave the data on the disk in encrypted format, without an easy way to decrypt it.

Perhaps the best known example is CIH, also known as Chernobyl. CIH, named after the initials of its author, Chen Ing-hau, was a computer virus that had the ability to wipe the BIOS flash memory. Computers affected by CIH couldn’t boot up anymore. This wasn’t a major problem for PCs, which had the BIOS memory in the form of a removal chip that could be reprogrammed on another system; however, for laptop owners, the CIH virus was quite destructive.

Over the last few years, we’ve seen a number of major incidents involving destructive malware.  We’ve decided to put together a brief summary the most important Wiper incidents:

1. The “Wiper”

In late-2011, early-2012, reports emerged about computer systems that were compromised and rendered unbootable.  The extent of the damage to these systems was so big that almost no data was recoverable. Some artefacts from the wiped systems indicated a possible link with Stuxnet and Duqu; however, these were never proven. The malware responsible for these attacks was named the "Wiper"; we wrote about it here.

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Eight Microsoft Security Bulletins are being pushed out this month, MS13-096 through MS13-106. Five of them are rated "Critical" and another six are rated "Important". The top priorities to roll out this month are the critical GDI+ (MS13-096), Internet Explorer (MS13-097), and Scripting Runtime (MS13-099) updates.

Several of the vulnerabilities have been actively exploited as a part of targeted attacks around the world, and one of them is known to be ItW for at least six months or so.

The GDI+ update patches memory corruption vulnerability CVE-2013-3906, which we have been detecting as Exploit.Win32.CVE-2013-3906.a. We have seen a low number of ITW variations on exploitation of this vulnerability as a malformed TIFF file, all dropping backdoors like Citadel, the BlackEnergy bot, PlugX, Taidoor, Janicab, Solar, and Hannover. The target profile and toolset distribution related to these exploit attempts suggest a broad array of likely threat actors that got their hands on it since this July, and a wide reaching distribution chain that provided the exploit around the world. Considering the variety of uses and sources, this one may replace cve-2012-0158 as a part of targeted attacks in terms of overall volume.

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The Internet Explorer Bulletin fixes seven different elevation of privilege and memory corruption vulnerabilities, any one of which effects Internet Explorer 6 on Windows XP SP 3 through Internet Explorer 11 on Windows Server 2012 R2 and Windows RT 8.1. We expect to see exploits for some of these vulnerabilities included in commodity exploit packs.

Finally, another critical vulnerability exists in the Windows Scripting Engine as yet another "use after free", which unfortunately enables remote code execution across every version of Windows out there and can be attacked via any of the common web browsers. Patch!

This post will likely be updated later today, but in the meantime, more about this month's patches can be found at the Microsoft site.

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Companies are increasingly falling victim to cyber-attacks. According to a recent survey conducted by Kaspersky Lab and B2B International, 9% of the organizations polled were the victims of targeted attacks - carefully planned activity aimed at infecting the network infrastructure of specific organization. The extensive use of digital devices in business has created ideal conditions for cyber-espionage and the deployment of malware capable of stealing corporate data.

The full report is available here.

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Two days ago FireEye reported that the recent CVE-2013-3906 exploit has begun to be used by new threat actors other than the original ones. The new infected documents share similarities with previously detected exploits but carry a different payload. This time these exploits are being used to deliver Taidoor and PlugX backdoors, according to FireEye.

At Kaspersky Lab we have also detected that yet another APT group has just started spreading malicious MS Word documents exploiting CVE-2013-3906. This APT actor is the Winnti group, which we described in detail here. They have sent spear-phishing emails with an attached document containing the exploit. As usual the Winnti perpetrators are trying to use this technique to deliver 1st stage malware - PlugX.

We became aware of an attack against one gaming company which constantly undergoes attacks from the Winnti group. The MS Word document containing the exploit shows the same TIFF “picture” - 7dd89c99ed7cec0ebc4afa8cd010f1f1 – that triggers the exploitation of the vulnerability, as in the Hangover attacks. If the exploitation is successful, the PlugX backdoor is downloaded from a remote URL:
hxxp://211.78.90.113/music/cover/as/update.exe.

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The Ekoparty Security Conference 2013 was held in the beautiful city of Buenos Aires, Argentina, from 25 to 27 September, This event,the most important security conference in Latin America, is now in its ninth year and was attended by 1,500 people. The slogan of this year’s conference was “Somebody is watching”.