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The Internet threat alert status is currently normal. At present, no major epidemics or other serious incidents have been recorded by Kaspersky Lab’s monitoring service. Internet threat level: 1
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=== Not really, especially in Latin America. Every day we register lots of similar attacks, each abusing local DNS settings. Actually these attacks are a bit different because they modify the local HOST file but the principle is the same – redirecting the victim to a malicious host via malicious DNS records.

Latin American cybercriminals are used to recycling old techniques used elsewhere in the past and what is happening right now is a growth of attacks abusing local DNS settings. The latest social engineering-based malware attack in Mexico – which imitated the Mexican tax office – is a recent example of this.

Incidents|The end of DNS-Changer

Marco
Kaspersky Lab Expert
Posted July 06, 13:28  GMT
Tags: Botnets, Infected Files and Devices, DNS, Microsoft
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FBI's “Operation Ghost Click” was discussed earlier by my colleague Kurt here and here and now it comes to an end.

Next Monday, 9th of July, at 06:00 (MEZ) the temporary DNS-servers setup by FBI will be shut down. But still there are still thousands of infected machines – one can wonder, what will happen to them?

Computers in the internet have their own address – the IP-address. There are two versions:

  • IPv4 which is a 32-bit address e.g. 195.122.169.23 and
  • IPv6 which is a 128-bit address e.g. 2001:db8:85a3:8d3:1319:8a2e:370:7347

You clearly see that these addresses are not so easy to remember compared to e.g. “kaspersky.com”. Therefore the “Domain Name System” was created which translates domain-names as “kaspersky.com” to their respective IP-address to connect to the server.

The DNS-Changer malware replaces the DNS-servers on the infected system with its own. FBI Press Release

The reason they do this is because it facilitates “Click Hijacking”. This is a technique where infected users are redirected to advertisement websites from the criminals and “Advertising Replacement” where on legitimate websites the advertisements were exchanged with one from the criminals.

Luckily, the FBI caught the criminals and installed temporary DNS-Servers in order to avoid a “black-out” for the mass of infected computers.

This temporary solution will come to an end on Monday when the servers are shut down. When this happens, the infected machines will no longer able to resolve domain names in order to connect to e.g. a website.

Of course, if you know the address of the server you can still use it instead of the name e.g. 195.122.169.23 is “securelist.com” but this is not easy solution.

We would like to point out that despite the big noise around this topic, there is no need to panic. The solution is rather simple – read below for more.

First of all, it might be interesting to point out that in 2012 we detected 101.964 attempts by DNSChanger malware to infect our users.

The good news is that the infections were blocked and the number of infection attempts is going down.

For instance, this map of the past week shows that the amount of infection attempts/detections as decreasing. Of course, computers with no or old protection are still in danger of possible unspotted infections.

So, how to check if you are infected with DNSChanger?

The DNS Changer Working Group provides helpful information on their website – unfortunately, we previously mentioned that automatic websites setup for this purpose do not work 100% well. So, the manual solution of checking the DNS server IPs is better.

If you are infected, you can change your DNS entries to the free DNS-Servers from Google: 8.8.8.8 and 8.8.4.4. OpenDNS also offers two: 208.67.222.222 and 208.67.220.220, which we also recommend for additional security features.

The best solution is of course to install a security suite capable of detecting and cleaning the infection and fixing the DNS servers.

Since many DNSChanger infections are accompanied by TDSS, a rather nasty rootkit, you can also use our tool “Kaspersky TDSSKiller” in order to detect and delete the infection

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Deep inside one of Stuxnet’s configuration blocks, a certain 8 bytes variable holds a number which, if read as a date, points to June 24th, 2012. This is actually the date when Stuxnet’s LNK replication sub-routines stop working and the worm stops infecting USB memory sticks.

Incidents|Flashfake Removal Tool and online-checking site

Aleks
Kaspersky Lab Expert
Posted April 09, 22:08  GMT
Tags: Botnets, Apple, Flashfake
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After intercepting one of the domain names used by the Flashback/Flashfake Mac Trojan and setting up a special sinkhole server last Friday, we managed to gather stats on the scale and geographic distribution of the related botnet. We published information on this in our previous blog entry.

We continued to intercept domain names after setting up the sinkhole server and we are currently still monitoring how big the botnet is. We have now recorded a total of 670,000 unique bots. Over the weekend (7-8 April) we saw a significant fall in the number of connected bots:

This doesn’t mean, however, that the botnet is shrinking rapidly – these are merely the numbers for the weekend.

Over the last few days our server has registered all the data sent by bots from the infected computers and recorded their UUIDs in a dedicated database. Based on this information we have set up an online resource where all users of Mac OS X can check if their computer has been infected by Flashback.

To find out if your computer is infected and what to do if it is, visit: flashbackcheck.com

Also users can check if they’re infected with Flashfake by using Kaspersky Lab’s free removal tool.

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Incidents|Flashfake Mac OS X botnet confirmed

Igor Soumenkov
Kaspersky Lab Expert
Posted April 06, 16:54  GMT
Tags: Apple MacOS, Botnets, Apple, Flashfake
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Earlier this week, Dr.Web reported the discovery of a Mac OS X botnet Flashback (Flashfake). According to their information, the estimated size of this botnet is more than 500, 000 infected Mac machines.

We followed up with an analysis of the latest variant of this bot, Trojan-Downloader.OSX.Flashfake.ab.

It is being distributed via infected websites as a Java applet that pretends to be an update for the Adobe Flash Player. The Java applet then executes the first stage downloader that subsequently downloads and installs the main component of the Trojan. The main component is a Trojan-Downloader that continuously connects to one of its command-and-control (C&C) servers and waits for new components to download and execute.

The bot locates its C&C servers by domain names, and these names are generated using two algorithms. The first algorithm depends on the current date, and the second algorithm uses several variables that are stored in the Trojan’s body and encrypted with the computer’s hardware UUID using RC4 cipher.

We reverse engineered the first domain generation algorithm and used the current date, 06.04.2012, to generate and register a domain name, "krymbrjasnof.com". After domain registration, we were able to log requests from the bots. Since every request from the bot contains its unique hardware UUID, we were able to calculate the number of active bots. Our logs indicate that a total of 600 000+ unique bots connected to our server in less than 24 hours. They used a total of 620 000+ external IP addresses. More than 50% of the bots connected from the United States.

Geographical distribution of active Flashfake bots

We cannot confirm nor deny that all of the bots that connected to our server were running Mac OS X. The bots can be only identified by a unique variable in their User-Agent HTTP header named “id”, the rest of the User-Agent is statically controlled by the Trojan. See example below:

"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:9.0.1; sv:2; id:9D66B9CD-0000-5BCF-0000-000004BD266A) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/9.0.1"

We have used passive OS fingerprinting techniques to get a rough estimation. More than 98% of incoming network packets were most likely sent from Mac OS X hosts. Although this technique is based on heuristics and can’t be completely trusted, it can be used for making order-of-magnitude estimates. So, it is very likely that most of the machines running the Flashfake bot are Macs.

Approximate distribution of OSes used to connect to our server
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Research|FAQ: Disabling the new Hlux/Kelihos Botnet

Stefan
Kaspersky Lab Expert
Posted March 28, 14:23  GMT
Tags: Botnets
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Q: What is the Hlux/Kelihos botnet?
A: Kelihos is Microsoft's name for what Kaspersky calls Hlux. Hlux is a peer-to-peer botnet with an architecture similar to the one used for the Waledac botnet. It consists of layers of different kinds of nodes: controllers, routers and workers.

Q: What is a peer-to-peer botnet?
A: Unlike a classic botnet, a peer-to-peer botnet doesn't use a centralized command and control-server (C&C). Every member of the network can act as a server and/or client. The advantages from the malicious user’s point of view is the omission of the central C&C as a single-point-of-failure. From our point of view, this makes it a lot harder to take down this kind of botnet.

Architecture of traditional botnet vs P2P:

Traditional botnet with centralized C&C

Traditional botnet with centralized C&C

Architecture of a P2P botnet

Architecture of a P2P botnet

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Last September, in partnership with Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit (DCU), SurfNET and Kyrus Tech, Inc., Kaspersky Lab successfully disabled the dangerous Hlux/Kelihos botnet by sinkholing the infected machines to a host under our control.

A few months later, our researchers stumbled upon a new version of the malware with significant changes in the communication protocol and new “features” like flash-drive infection, bitcoin-mining wallet theft.

Now, we are pleased to announce that we have partnered with the CrowdStrike Intelligence Team, the Honeynet Project and Dell SecureWorks to disable this new botnet.

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The internet is full of infected hosts. Let's just make a conservative guesstimate that there are more than 40 million infected victim hosts and malware serving "hosts" connected to the internet at any one time, including both traditional computing devices, network devices and smartphones. That's a lot of resources churning out cybercrime, viruses, worms, exploits, spyware. There have been many suggestions about how to go about cleaning up the mess, the challenges are complex, and current cleanups taking longer than expected.

Mass exploitation continues to be an ongoing effort for cybercriminals and a major problem - it's partly a numbers game for them. Although exploiting and infecting millions of machines may attract LE attention at some point, it's a risk some are willing to take in pursuit of millions of dollars that could probably be better made elsewhere with the same effort. So take, for example, the current DNSChanger cleanup. Here is a traditional profit motivated 4 million PC and Mac node malware case worked by the Fbi, finishing with a successful set of arrests and server takedown.

Research|The where and why of HLUX

Sergey Golovanov
Kaspersky Lab Expert
Posted February 15, 09:54  GMT
Tags: Botnets, TDSS
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This is not the first time the HLUX botnet has been mentioned in this blog, but there are still some unanswered questions that we’ve been receiving from the media: What is the botnet’s sphere of activity? What sort of commands does it receive from malicious users? How does the bot spread? How many infected computers are there in the botnet?

Before answering the questions it’s important to clarify that the HLUX botnet we previously disabled is still under control and the infected machines are not receiving commands from the C&C, so they’re not sending spam. Together with Microsoft’s Digital Crimes Unit, SurfNET and Kyrus Tech, Inc., Kaspersky Lab executed a sinkhole operation, which disabled the botnet and its backup infrastructure from the C&C.

The answers below refer to a new version of the HLUX botnet – it’s a different botnet but the malware being used is build using the same HLUX coding. Analysis of a new bot version for the HLUX botnet (md5: 010AC0BFF69EB945108B57B40A4784BE, size: 882176 B) revealed the following information.

Why?

As we already known, the bot distributes spam and has the ability to conduct DDoS attacks. In addition, we have discovered that:

  1. The bot is capable of infecting flash drives, creating a file on them called “Copy a Shortcut to google.Ink” in the same way Stuxnet did.
  2. The bot can search for configuration files for numerous FTP clients and transfer them to its command servers.
  3. The bot has a built-in Bitcoin wallet theft feature.
  4. The bot also includes a Bitcoin miner feature.
  5. The bot can operate in proxy server mode.
  6. The bot searches hard drives for files containing email addresses.
  7. The bot has a sniffer for intercepting email, FTP and HTTP session passwords.


Part of the HLUX code that interacts with FTP clients


Part of the HLUX code used to steal Bitcoin wallets

Where does it come from?

The bot is loaded onto users’ computers from numerous sites hosted on fast flux domains primarily in the .EU domain zone. The bot installs small downloaders (~47 KB) on the system. These downloaders have been detected on computers in the GBOT and Virut botnets. The downloaders can be loaded to computers within minutes of a machine being infected by the malware mentioned above (GBOT and Virut). This distribution method hinders the detection of the primary bot distribution source.

Bot installations have also been detected during drive-by attacks that make use of the Incognito exploit kit.

The number of computers in the new HLUX botnet is estimated to be tens of thousands, based on the numbers in the approximately 8000 IP addresses detected in operations conducted via P2P.

Where’s it going?

As before, the HLUX botnet primarily receives commands to distribute spam. However, another malicious program, which we wrote about here, is also being installed on the botnet. Its main functionality is fraudulent manipulation of search engines along the lines of TDSS.

The passwords harvested from FTP are used to place malicious Javascripts on websites that redirect users of the compromised sites once again to Incognito exploit kit. Exploits for the CVE-2011-3544 vulnerability are primarily used when the bot is installed during these attacks. In other words, HLUX implements a cyclical distribution scheme just like that used by Bredolab.

Summary

The HLUX botnet, both old and new, is a classic example of organized crime in action on the Internet. The owners of this botnet take part in just about every type of online scam going: sending spam, theft of passwords, manipulation of search engines, DDoS etc.

It is not uncommon for new versions of botnets to appear, and it’s one of the challenges we face in the IT security industry. We can neutralize botnet attacks and delay cyber criminal activities but ultimately the only way to take botnets down is to arrest and persecute the creators and groups operating them. This is a difficult task because security companies face different federal policies and legislation in various countries where botnets are located. This causes the law enforcement investigations and legal process to be a long and arduous process.

We’ll continue monitoring this particular botnet and keep you up to speed with any technical developments.

P.S. We noticed this on one fast flux domain that was earlier spreading HLUX:


It’s not yet clear whether this is the control panel of the HLUX botnet.

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Virus Watch|Kelihos/Hlux botnet returns with new techniques

Maria Garnaeva
Kaspersky Lab Expert
Posted January 31, 11:00  GMT
Tags: Botnets
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It has been four months since Microsoft and Kaspersky Lab announced the disruption of Kelihos/Hlux botnet. The sinkholing method that was used has its advantages — it is possible to disable a botnet rather quickly without taking control over the infrastructure.However,as this particular case showed, it is not very effective if the botnet’s masters are still at large.

Not long after we disrupted Kehilos/Hlux, we came across new samples that seemed to be very similar to the initial version. After some investigation, we gathered all the differences between the two versions. This is a summary of our findings:

Let’s start with the lowest layer, the encryption and packing of Kelihos/Hlux messages in the communication protocol. For some reason, in the new version, the order of operations was changed. Here are the steps of processing an encrypted data for retrieving a job message which is organized as a tree structure:

Old Hlux New Hlux
1 Blowfish with key1 Blowfish with new key1
2 3DES with key2 Decompression with Zlib
3 Blowfish with key3 3DES with new key2
4 Decompression with Zlib Blowfish with new key3