13 Jun AutoRun. Reloaded Konstantin Markov
06 Jun The most sophisticated Android Trojan Roman Unuchek
03 Jun What are children doing online? Konstantin Ignatev
03 Jun Jumcar. Peruvian navy? Who could be behind it? [Third part] Jorge Mieres
27 May Jumcar. Timeline, crypto, and specific functions. [Second part] Jorge Mieres
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Kaspersky Lab’s products detect these special worms as Worm.JS.AutoRun and Worm.Java.AutoRun. They are also detected by heuristic methods as HEUR:Worm.Script.Generic and HEUR:Worm.Java.Generic respectively.
These two worms have three key features in common: heavy obfuscation, backdoor-type essential payloads, and similar methods of propagation. Both worms spread by copying themselves and the configuration file autorun.inf into the root folders of logical volumes of removable storage media and network disks. If these infected storages are opened on other computers, the infection can spread. Having infected the operating system and established a foothold on the victim computer, the malicious programs deploy their principal payload.
For months, the number of AutoRun worms detected on Kaspersky Lab users’ computers remained essentially unchanged. According to Kaspersky Security Network data, half of all script worms spread themselves this way. As for Java worms, this is not their usual method of propagation. However, in the last three months we have seen a dramatic rise in the number of new Worm.Java.AutoRun modifications.
Recently, an Android application came to us for analysis. At a glance, we knew this one was special. All strings in the DEX file were encrypted, and the code was obfuscated.
The file turned out to be a multi-functional Trojan, capable of the following: sending SMS to premium-rate numbers; downloading other malware programs, installing them on the infected device and/or sending them further via Bluetooth; and remotely performing commands in the console. Now, Kaspersky Labís products detect this malicious program as Backdoor.AndroidOS.Obad.a.
Malware writers typically try to make the codes in their creations as complicated as possible, to make life more difficult for anti-malware experts. However, it is rare to see concealment as advanced as Odad.aís in mobile malware. Moreover, this complete code obfuscation was not the only odd thing about the new Trojan.
The creators of Backdoor.AndroidOS.Obad.a found an error in the popular DEX2JAR software Ė this program is typically used by analysts to convert APK files into the more convenient Java Archive (JAR) format. This vulnerability spotted by the cybercriminals disrupts the conversion of Dalvik bytecode into Java bytecode, which eventually complicates the statistical analysis of the Trojan.
Over the last few years, we have been monitoring a cyber-espionage campaign that has successfully compromised more than 350 high profile victims in 40 countries. The main tool used by the threat actors during these attacks is NetTraveler, a malicious program used for covert computer surveillance.
The name ďNetTravelerĒ comes from an internal string which is present in early versions of the malware: ďNetTraveler Is Running!Ē This malware is used by APT actors for basic surveillance of their victims. Earliest known samples have a timestamp of 2005, although references exist indicating activity as early as 2004. The largest number of samples we observed were created between 2010 and 2013.
The NetTraveler builder icon
Kaspersky Lab’s mission is to protect the world from viruses. But the company also believes it has a duty to safeguard our children from content which could be harmful to youngsters. In order to carry out this important task, Kaspersky Lab’s products integrate a special component named Parental Control.
This component allows caring parents to control their children’s computer and Internet activity. For example, Parental Control allows parents to easily restrict the time their children spend using the computer or surfing the web.
In addition, Parental Control enables parents to restrict the launch of certain applications and to monitor their children's activities on social networks and chat sites. One of the most important functions of this module is to limit access to potentially harmful web resources. Many of these, of course, are adult content sites. However, social networks, forums and even online stores can also pose a threat. The module currently includes 14 different categories of sites, enabling parents to decide which are undesirable for their child. Here are the categories:
About a year ago we described how Parental Control worked with different web resources. At that time the statistics only considered resources which had been blocked by the Parental Control tools. Since then we have improved the mechanism of collecting statistical data and now we can identify the categories of sites which are most popular with youngsters, regardless of whether Parental Control allows them to visit or not.
That is why our worldwide statistics on the sites most frequently visited by children in 2013 varies considerably from the previous year’s figures.
We know that the family of malware called Trojan.MSIL.Jumcar and Trojan.Win32.Jumcar was developed in Peru with the primary aim of attacking Peruvian users. We also know that Chilean and Peruvian users have latterly been targeted as well. You can read more about this in our preliminary reports:
During the initial investigation we saw a very striking series of strings from the source code of the first variants: "Armada Peruana". This is the Peruvian navy.
Jumcar stands out from other malicious code developed in Latin America because of its particularly aggressive features. At the moment three generations of this malware family exist, which basically use symmetric algorithms in the first and second generation, and an asymmetric algorithm in the third. In this manner the configuration parameters are hidden, progressively increasing the complexity of the variants.
In the first generation, data is encrypted with AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). We estimate that the first variant was released in March 2012, and that other pieces of malware with similar characteristics were being developed until August of the same year. That is to say over a six month period.
In this first stage, 75% of the phishing campaigns targeted Peruvian consumers that use home-banking services. The 25% remaining targeted users in Chile.
The following diagram shows multiple instances used by the second generation of Jumcar:
ďJumcarĒ is the name we have given to a family of malicious code developed in Latin America Ė particularly in Peru Ė and which, according to our research, has been deploying attack maneuvers since March 2012.
After six months of research we can now detail the specific features of Jumcar. We will communicate these over the following days. Essentially the main purpose of the malware is stealing financial information from Latin American users who use the home-banking services of major banking companies. Of these, 90% are channeled in Peru through phishing strategies based on cloning the websites of six banks.
Some variants of the Jumcar family also target two banks in Chile, and another in Costa Rica.
Continuing our investigation into Winnti, in this post we describe how the group tried to re-infect a certain gaming company and what malware they used. After discovering that the company-s servers were infected, we began to clean them up in conjunction with the company-s system administrator, removing malicious files from the corporate network. This took a while because it was not clear at first exactly how the cybercriminals had penetrated the corporate network; we couldn-t find a way to completely stop attacks penetrating the network and malicious files kept appearing. An analysis performed by the gaming company itself led us to the conclusion that the infection started after establishing working contacts with a South Korean gaming company. This was also confirmed by our research: as we wrote before, the Winnti group is most active in East Asia and we identified 14 infected gaming companies in South Korea.
In the course of our efforts to remove the infection, the gaming company sent us suspicious files that were appearing on their computers. Many of these files were samples of Winnti malware. As soon as information about the malicious files was added to our antivirus databases, our products were used to remove Winnti malware from the gaming company-s corporate network. However, the attackers reacted very rapidly: new malware samples mysteriously appeared on computers from which the infection had been completely removed the previous day. Eventually, though, our efforts proved successful and further access to the gaming company-s computers was denied to the attackers.
However, just as we expected, it was too early to celebrate. Exactly one month after the gaming company-s network had been cleaned, the Winnti group returned. The system administrator sent us suspicious files, which had been attached to messages sent to company employees. This was run-of-the-mill spearphishing: the attackers introduced themselves as computer game developers and pretended to be looking for opportunities related to working with large publishers.
During our research on the Winnti group we discovered a considerable amount of Winnti samples targeting different gaming companies. Using this sophisticated malicious program cybercriminals gained remote access to infected workstations and then carried out further activity manually.
Naturally, we were keen to find out how the malicious libraries spread across a local network. To do so, we tracked the attackers- activity on an infected computer.
At the beginning of the investigation we ran the malicious programs on a virtual machine, which worked fairly well - we even spotted some cybercriminal activity. But they quickly realized it wasn-t a computer they wanted to net. Once that was the case, the attackers- servers stopped responding to requests from bots working on virtual machines.
This is what we managed to learn at this stage of our monitoring.
First of all, the perpetrators looked at what was happening on the victim-s desktop. After that they enabled the remote command line and used it to browse the root folder of the current disk, searched for the file winmm.dll, and checked the operating system version. The ListFileManager plugin then came into play. It works with the file system and the attackers used it to browse the folders C:\Windows and C:\Work. Then they tried to restart the computer, but made a mistake in the parameters of the ?shutdownĀ command, having typed ?shutdown /t /r 1Ā (the computer should have been restarted in 1 second), but after a while they shut the computer down completely with the use of the correct command ?shutdown /s /t 1Ā.