English
The Internet threat alert status is currently normal. At present, no major epidemics or other serious incidents have been recorded by Kaspersky Lab’s monitoring service. Internet threat level: 1

Big Brother

Dmitry Tarakanov
Kaspersky Lab Expert
Posted May 21, 14:10  GMT
Tags: SpyEye
0.5
 

It seems that development of the main module of SpyEye stopped with last autumn’s version 1.3.48 – and this is now the dominant strain of SpyEye malware.

SpyEye distribution by versions for the period since 1 January 2012*
* Others (7%) includes: 1.2.50, 1.2.58, 1.2.71, 1.2.80, 1.2.82, 1.2.93, 1.3.5, 1.3.9, 1.3.25, 1.3.26, 1.3.30, 1.3.32, 1.3.37, 1.3.41, 1.3.44.

But just because the authors are not developing this platform further, it doesn’t mean that SpyEye is no longer getting new functions. The core code allows anyone to create and attach their own plugins (DLL libraries). I’ve been analyzing SpyEye samples since the start of the year, and I’ve counted 35 different plugins. Below you can see a table with those plugins and the corresponding number of samples in which they were included:

customconnector.dll783
ccgrabber.dll224
rdp.dll149
socks5.dll138
socks.dll80
keylog.dll80
ftpbc.dll78
spySpread.dll54
webfakes.dll52
ffcertgrabber.dll22
emailgrabber.dll13
ftpgrabber.dll13
jabbernotifier.dll10
bugreport.dll5
flashcamcontrol.dll5
stb_3_4.dll4
hookspy.dll3
f.dll3
Plugin_USBSpread.dll3
c.dll3
ddos.dll3
save_2_0.dll1
tgr1.dll1
mrz_3_5.dll1
customconector.dll1
brgr_1_0.dll1
zuchek2_6.dll1
creditgrab.dll1
win_sound.dll1
dk.dll1
save_1_0.dll1
doberman_v_4_7.dll1
jazz_3_2.dll1
kill.dll1
skdv_0_7.dll1
  

I recently spotted a new plugin for the first time - flashcamcontrol.dll. Its name intrigued me and I took a look inside to clarify what it does. It turned out that it is used to control the webcam of an infected computer. This plugin has a configuration file and I found a list of site names of German banks in it. The library flashcamcontrol.dll adjusts FlashPlayer permissions, allowing flash documents downloaded from selected sites on the configuration list to use the webcam and microphone without a request to the user, as shown below:

This is how DLL does it. Using the FlashPlayer settings path:

it searches for folders related to the bank by mask "#<bank site name>", and the file “settings.sol” in that folder is patched:

enabling the “allow always” options for the webcam and microphone.

That’s all this library does. Obviously, this is just part of a bigger plan, and there is more to it. I discovered something more in the configuration of another SpyEye plugin called webfakes.dll, where the following rules are specified:

If an infected user visits the site of a specified bank and the browser processing the page requests a flash-document via a link from the first column, the webfakes.dll plugin (which runs in a browser context) detects that request and replaces it with an address from the second column – an address controlled by the intruders. As a result, the browser will load a malicious document from the intruder’s server (statistiktop.com) instead of a flash document from the bank site.

Here, I assumed that banks were using webcams to help confirm the identity of their online clients, and cybercriminals wanted to circumvent this new measure. My first assumption was face recognition. This idea has been around for quite a while: during registration, the client is photographed, biometric parameters are saved in the server and every time the user logs on, an up-to-date picture from the webcam is compared with the archive parameters.

However, while some organizations have developed this approach and made it available, it is not widely used by online banking services. We contacted the banks listed in the SpyEye plugins, and they confirmed that none of them use webcams to identify their clients.

Moreover, webfake’s links to download flash-documents from bank sites would be unworkable – there are no such documents on the sites in question. But the rogue documents linked from the second column (i.e. on the intruder’s server) do exist. It turned out that both flash documents merely create a window with a picture from the webcam. One of them sends a video stream to the intruder’s server:

The other kicks in if the lens of the webcam is closed. It alerts the user to an apparent problem, and advises – in Russian – to select another camera. That document, Camera_test.swf, has been found on several different sites. So, it may be a known test template to use Flash to control a webcam:

“See nothing? Try selecting another camera from list.”

This is not the first time that cybercriminals using online banks have tried to get video and audio footage of victims. My colleague Dmitry Bestuzhev recalls a case when a malicious program targeting clients of an Ecuadorian bank also had functionality to record video and audio footage on the infected computer and to send it to intruders. This too was not related to optical client recognition - the Ecuadorian bank had no such feature implemented.

It all begs the question – why film your victim? Apparently, cybercriminals watch the user’s reaction when the theft is in process. As usual, money is stolen in the following way: the user types his/her login data into the bank site, but the code of the bank’s page is modified by malware directly in the browser and after authorization the user doesn’t see the bank account but the malware creates a window with a message saying, for example, “Loading... Please wait...”. At the same time, injected malicious code prepares to send the stolen money to an accomplice’s bank account. Once that’s done, in order to confirm the transaction, cybercriminals have to persuade the user to enter a secret code, which could be received by SMS. This is when social engineering is used: the intruder’s program puts a request on the victim’s screen, something like: “We have strengthened security measures. Please confirm your identity entering the secret code we have sent to your phone.”

This is the moment which is of interest to the cybercriminals: how will the user react to an unexpected request for an SMS code? In the Ecuadorian case, as Dmitry Bestuzhev explained, when a user requests a transaction, it’s possible that the bank will call to confirm the secret code. Using a microphone, the intruder can listen in, and later the criminal can call the bank himself, masquerading as a client whose code he has eavesdropped. With this code it becomes possible to update the phone and login details, taking full control of the victim’s account.

Let’s return to the scheme being used by SpyEye. As we discovered, there are no flash documents working with webcam on banking sites. So why would the browser request these documents? That’s all to do with another fundamental SpyEye mechanism – web injects. When a user visits a site where the web inject section has rules ready to use, SpyEye follows those rules and injects malicious code into the freshly downloaded original code of that site. In this case, a malicious fragment is inserted into the code on certain pages of the bank site and that fragment allegedly links to flash document hosting by the bank.

This is how the whole thing works, from the initial connection to the site up to the criminal watching video footage from the victim’s webcam:

And here we see how the cybercriminals are not only harvesting our money, but also our emotions.


1 comments

Francis Turner

2012 May 29, 14:04
0
 

Yet another bulletproof hoster in Ukraine

If you stop traffic to Ukraine you would avoid infection as I pointed out on our blog here - http://blog.threatstop.com/2012/05/29/is-there-anything-in-ukraine-except-cyber-crime/

Reply    
If you would like to comment on this article you must first
login


Bookmark and Share
Share

Blog